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Framing the Problem and Making Decisions:
The Facts are Not Enough
DENNIS DUCHON, KENNETH J. DUNEGAN,

Abstract-One hundred ten engineers, scientists, and managers in a
high-technology international engineering firm took part in an experiment that assessed the effect of framing on an R&D financial allocation
decision. Subtle changes in frame of reference are found to have a
powerful effect on decisions and perception of risk. R&D management
implications are discussed.

AND

SIDNEY L. BARTON

and engineering managers are subject to its influence. The data
analysis reported below even takes into account the degree to
which subjects see themselves as rational versus intuitive
decision makers. This self-perception thus allows us to take
into account a personal characteristic which might lead to
differences in choice [7].

INTRODUCTION

C

HOICES and the explanation of choices made in R&D
management-why certain projects are selected, why they
are funded at a given level, and why they are terminated-are
often assumed to have a rational basis. Although what exactly
constitutes that rational basis has been much debated, there is
general agreement that rational choice should satisfy some
elementary requirements of consistency and coherence [7].
Yet Tversky and Kahneman [7] have demonstrated that
people often systematically violate requirements of consistency and coherence. These violations come as a result of
decision makers adopting different frames for their decisions.
Frames refer to the decision maker’s conception of the acts,
outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular
choice. The adoption of a given frame depends not only on the
personal characteristics of the decision maker, but also on the
formulation of the problem itself. Thus, objective facts can
take on different meaning when framed differently. Specifically, different formulations of a decision problem using the
same objective facts can lead to different decisions. Consider,
for example, a financial allocation decision for a project that is
going badly. Does the project manager “see” the project’s
future potential, or does he or she “see” the difficulties.
Whether or not the project continues to be funded will depend
in part on how it is seen, that is, in how the objective facts are
framed or presented.
The present experiment manipulates very subtly the framing
of an R&D financial allocation decision. Framing has been
shown to influence the decisions of student subjects who work
at abstract decision-making tasks [5]. This study extends the
examination of framing effects by using experienced organizational decision makers who make a decision that is apropos of
their work life. Framing would indeed be a potent factor in
R&D management decision making if engineers, scientists,
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METHOD

Subjects
One hundred ten professional employees of a high-technology international engineering firm took part in the experiment.
Fifty-two of the subjects hold a bachelor’s degree, 51 hold a
master’s degree, and seven hold a Ph.D. Subjects represent
both managerial and technical personnel, although 76 percent
of the sample are engineers or scientists. The sample is
predominately male (98 males, 8 females, and 4 subjects for
whom gender data are not available). The sample on average is
33.8 years of age, has 5.2 years of experience with the firm,
and supervises 2.7 people. Subjects also represent different
nationalities including English, Japanese, French, and German, although most of the subjects (69 percent) are citizens of
the United States.

Procedure and Manipulation
Subjects read the following financial allocation scenario:
As R&D manager, one of your project teams has come to
you requesting an additional $100 OOO in funds for a project
you instituted several months ago. The project is already
behind schedule and over budget, but the team still believes it
can be successfully completed. You currently have $500 OOO
remaining in your budget unallocated, but which must carry
you for the rest of the fiscal year. Lowering the balance by an
additional $100 OOO might jeopardize flexibility to respond to
other opportunities.
Evaluating the situation, you believe there is a fair chance
the project will not succeed, in which case the additional
funding would be lost; if successful, however, the money
would be well spent ...

The last sentence of the scenario for subjects randomly
assigned to one frame (Frame 1) condition read: “Of the
projects undertaken by the team, 30 of the last 50 have been
successful.” The last sentence of the scenario for subjects
randomly assigned to the other frame (Frame 2) condition read:
“Of the projects undertaken by this team, 20 of the last 50
have been unsuccessful.” Note that, statistically, the team’s
success ratio is 60 percent in both cases.
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The wording for the framing conditions in both cases was
adapted from Davis and Bobko [ 2 ] . Note that the framing
conditions are subtle but offer different reference points for the
decision problem. Furthermore, as an assessment of the
decision problem’s face validity, three members of the
company’s top management reviewed the scenario and unanimously agreed it represented a decision the subjects would
understand and may reasonably encounter on their jobs.

COvariate
Because the issue of “rational” choice is important, and
because the sample is assumed to have a “rational” disposition due to training and experience, an assessment of the
subjects’ perception of their disposition toward rational
decision making was made. Lee [5]has argued that it is useful
to describe people along a continuum of rationality; therefore,
subjects gave a self-assessment of themselves as either rational
or intuitive decision makers by responding on a seven-point
scale to a question which asked, “In general, do you consider
yourself to be ... The seven-point scale was anchored by 1 =
a rational decision maker and 7 = an intuitive decision maker.
The scale anchors were chosen to reflect fundamentally
different decision-making approaches: a rational approach
(i.e., systematic, objective, logical) and an intuitive approach
(i.e., attaining cognition without evident systematic thought).
The term “irrational” is not an appropriate opposite anchor
for “rational” because it has a strong pejorative connotation.
Intuitive, on the other hand, does suggest a process very
different from rational, but one which does not carry an
undesirable connotation.
The average response was 3.3 (i.e., on the “rational” side
of the scale). The standard deviation (SD) was 1.44, and
responses ranged from 1 to 7. This self-perception report was
used as a covariate in portions of the analyses to control for
disposition toward rationality which may have altered responses independent of framing conditions.

INCLINATION

TO
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as framing changes perceptions of the decision-making problem, so too will it change perceptions of the risk in the
problem. Subjects responded to a scale item in which they
indicated the degree of risk they believed associated with
additional funding: 1 = No risk, 2 = Some risk, 3 = Normal
risk, 4 = Considerable risk, 5 = Too risky.
RESULTS

”

Dependent Measures
After reading the scenario, subjects indicated the likelihood
they would fund the request by selecting from alternatives on
the following five-point scale:
~~~

~~~

Reject
~~~~

~~~~~~~~

Lean T o w a r d
Rejecting

~

1
~~~~~

~~

2
~~~~~~

Lean T o w a r d
Funding

Uncertain
~~~~

Fund

~~~

3

5

4
~~~~

~~

In addition to indicating whether or not they would fund the
project, subjects were asked to indicate the level of risk they
believed was associated with providing the additional funding.
If framing alters the psychology of decision making by altering
perception of the problem, then it seems likely that framing is
also altering the decision maker’s perception of the risk she or
he is taking when making the decision. Rational decision
makers are not people who take chances just for the thrill of it.
Rather, rational decision makers are likely risk avoiders or
risk minimizers who make decisions consistent with their
perception of risk in the decision-making episode. Therefore,

Data Analysis
Table I reports the inclination that subjects would fund the
request in the decision scenario. Subjects in Frame 1 indicate a
stronger inclination to fund the project than subjects in Frame 2
(average response Frame 1 , 3.97 versus 3.50 for Frame 2 ) .
When inclination to fund the request is used as the dependent
variable in a one-way analysis of covariance (with degree of
rationality used as the covariate), significant differences are
indicated in the dependent variable ( F = 1.95, p < 0.05, R 2
= 0.19). Examination of the variables in the model indicate a
significant effect for framing (F = 1 3 . 8 5 , ~< 0.001), but not
for the covariate ( F = 0.07, ns). Thus, even when controlling
for possible differences in degree of rationality for presumably
very “rational” decision makers, framing effects are found.
Therefore, framing and not degree of rationality accounts for
differences in behavior in this study.
Framing is also related to perception of risk. When asked to
report the degree of risk they perceive in the decision scenario,
the average response of subjects in Frame 1 is 3.01 (SD =
0.68), while the average response of subjects in Frame 2 is
3.34 (SD = 0.64). These responses are significantly different
(t = 2.54, p < 0.05). Thus, the subtle frame of reference
manipulation affected perceptions of objective risk. It can also
be noted that the correlation between perception of risk and
inclination to fund the request is - 0.21 ( p < 0.05). That is,
subjects who see greater risk in the scenario are less likely to
fund the request. Thus, framing not only changed the
perception of objective risk in the project, but also led to
differences in an inclination to fund the project.

DISCUSSION
This paper reports the results of an experiment in which a
sample of experienced engineers, scientists, and managerspeople who would be expected to be objective decision
makers, and who report themselves to be rational decision
makers-are influenced by very subtle informational cues.
These subtle cues did not alter the object facts in an R&D
financial allocation decision, but they did apparently alter the
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decision maker’s reference point. The cues also apparently
altered the degree of risk perceived in the decision scenario.
As a result, the decision makers exposed to different frames
made different decisions, and reported perceiving different
levels of risk in the decision episode.
The data presented in this paper clearly demonstrate that
knowing “just the facts” in a decision-making situation is
insufficient for predicting choice. Understanding choice requires an understanding of the decision maker’s frame of
reference. Different frames of reference can lead to different
choices because different reference frames lead to different
interpretations of what the facts mean. This by no means
implies that the decision makers in this experiment acted
“irrationally.” The decision makers in this experiment were
quite “rational” from at least one view of consistency because
those perceiving the decision to continue funding to be a risky
one were less inclined to fund than those perceiving the
decision to be less risky. Yet those choosing either to fund or
not to fund were operating with the same objective facts. That
is, the same facts still lead to inconsistent choices. This
suggests that it is unwise to assume that even experienced
engineers, scientists, and managers can reliably achieve a
unitary interpretation of the facts.
Several explanations have been offered for why framing the
facts in different ways can lead to different decisions.
Kahneman and Tversky’s [4] prospect theory posits that
framing differences lead to systematic differences in the way
decision makers process and edit information. These processing and editing differences lead to different choices. Arkes and
Blumer [l] have elaborated on certain aspects of prospect
theory by arguing that decision makers in a situation similar to
the one captured in our decision scenario are responding to
sunk costs. That is, the psychological weight of the commitment of money, time, and effort that goes into a decision
represent costs that are sunk into the decision, costs which are
difficult, even impossible, to ignore when later the decision
appears to have been a bad one. Rather than reversing oneself,
Arkes and Blumer [11 contend that the decision maker does not
want to appear wasteful of the money, time, and effort already
spent; and so she or he will continue to fund a project, even
though objectively such funding may not be defensible. These
explanations are valuable, but the mechanisms of the psychology of decision making are imperfectly understood and future
research is needed, especially research focusing on real
decision makers, not only to explore the mechanisms of
framing but also to explore the kinds of reference points
decision makers adopt.
Although the underlying mechanisms of framing are not
perfectly understood, several implications for R&D management can be drawn from this study. First, managers need to
realize that the “facts” do not speak for themselves. Rather,
the facts are interpreted in terms of a frame of reference. Over
the course of time the norms and social expectations within an
R&D group can lead to a common set of assumptions about

“what we do” and “what we are.” In a sense the group
adopts a common frame within which all “facts” are
interpreted. While this process makes certain kinds of communication easier, it also leads to intellectual blindspots.
Because of the common frame of reference, the group tends to
identify and solve the same problems over and over. And there
are never any questions or doubts because all agree on what
“facts” mean and the “facts” tell us “we’re doing the only
thing we can do.” Janis [3], for example, has noted how this
can happen to highly cohesive decision-making groups. To
prevent such a problem, management needs to consider
problems from different points of view or different frames.
Multiple frames can ensure a less biased view of the “facts”
associated with a problem and, therefore, better decisions.
Encouraging the development of different frames of reference can also, however, lead to conflict. The conflict will not
be about “facts,” but rather about “interpretation of facts. ”
Yet, such conflict can be resolved by having people identify
the frame of reference they use in understanding the facts.
Also, conflict can be defused by reminding people that
multiple reference points are valuable and useful if the
organization is to remain vital.
Understanding reference points and risk taking can also help
managers in the organization. The data in this study suggest
that describing a project (even a troubled project) in positive
and hopeful terms (Frame 1) lessens the perceived risk
associated with that project. Managers can thus generate
support by using framing to reduce the perceived risks
associated with their project.
Frame of reference is an important concept to understand,
especially for people accustomed to dealing with facts. In
addition to the facts, the effective R&D manager will be
sensitive to interpretational differences among people, and be
aware of how easily frame of reference can be influenced.
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